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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1984 Allen v. Wright decision, the Supreme Court denied 
standing to a nationwide class of plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to enact a policy that would deny 
tax benefits to racially discriminatory private schools. l The plaintiffs 
sued on behalf of black children attending desegregating public 
schools located near the discriminatory private schools. 2 The Court 
noted that to have standing to sue in a federal court a party must 
allege an injury, a chain of causation tracing the injury to the action 
in question and a sufficient likelihood that the relief sought will 
redress the injury.3 While the Allen plaintiffs alleged sufficient in-
I Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 744, 766 (1984), aff'g Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), aff'g Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979). 
2 [d. at 744. The term "desegregating" denotes that the schools were in the process of 
undergoing desegregation. 
3 [d. at 751-52. The doctrine of standing requires that parties have a "case" or "contro-
versy" within the meaning of article III of the Constitution in order for a federal court to 
have jurisdiction over the claim. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 107 (2d ed. 
1988) [hereinafter L. TRIBE, ACLj. 
Under article III, § 2 of the Constitution: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
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jury, the Court found that the interposition of the defendant IRS 
between the plaintiffs and the discriminatory schools causing the 
injury prevented satisfaction of the causation and redressability 
elements.4 The Court interpreted these elements of standing 
through the prism of the constitutional separation of powers,5 ex-
pressing concern over judicial intervention in the tax policy and 
enforcement realms of the other branches of government.6 
The Allen Court's denial of standing in deference to separation 
of powers concerns despite "serious" constitutional injury7 repre-
sents a dilemma over the proper role of the judiciary in society. 
Allen indicates that certain injuries are beyond the scope of judicial 
attention due to the involvement of other branches of government 
and concern for the institutional position of the judiciary. This 
dilemma over the judiciary's role is a question of jurisprudence, the 
science of determining the principles underlying legal rules and 
guiding the resolution of conflicting norms.8 
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between 
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between 
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2. 
4 Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-61. 
5 See U.S. CaNST. art. I-III (allocating legislative power to Congress, executive power 
to the President and judicial power to the courts). 
6 Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-61. Judicial caution over granting standing to allow challenges 
to the policies of other branches of government has a long history. See Frothingham v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (denying standing to taxpayers seeking to challenge govern-
mental spending policies with which they disagreed); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-
500 (1975) (courts should not "decide abstract questions of wide public significance" where 
"other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions"); Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (federal judiciary is circumscribed "to a role consistent with a system of 
separated powers ... "). 
A 1968 decision, however, allowed a group of taxpayers to challenge federal aid to 
religious schools under the first amendment, finding that standing "does not, by its own 
force, raise separation of powers problems .... " Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968). A 
line of cases has followed this theory to grant standing where governmental actions supported 
third parties' discrimination against plaintiffs. See Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), aff'g 
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (tax benefits for discriminatory private 
schools in Mississippi); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state textbook-lending 
program to discriminatory institutions); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) 
(city allowed segregated private schools to use desegregated public parks). 
7 Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
8 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 767 (5th ed. 1979). In a broad sense, jurisprudence is the 
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The Allen Court's use of separation of powers to deny standing 
provides a focal point for assessing three schools of jurisprudence. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, an adherent to the Law and Economics 
school of jurisprudence, proposes that Allen is an example of that 
school's philosophy of avoiding judicial intervention into adminis-
trative agencies where the resulting regulation would be inefficient.9 
The Allen Court's circumscription of the judicial role in deference 
to the pluralistic choices of legislative decision-making is consistent 
with the Law and Economics school. lO 
The constitutional scholar, Professor Laurence Tribe, provides 
a second jurisprudential view of the Allen decision. Professor Tribe 
criticizes Judge Easterbrook's thesis, arguing that "[t ]he Constitution 
cannot be cabined in any calculus of costs and benefits."11 With 
regard to the Allen case, Professor Tribe argues that a cost-benefit 
analysis is inappropriate in deciding standing to bring an equal 
protection claim. 12 He maintains that values more important than 
efficiency are central to constitutional interpretation. 13 The preem-
inence in Professor Tribe's theory of public values interpreted from 
the Constitution is consistent with what Professor Robert Weisberg 
calls the New Legal Process school of jurisprudence. 14 This school 
advocates an "aggressive and imaginative" judicial role, antithetical 
to the Allen Court's deference to other branches of government. 15 
Justice Brennan presents a third perspective in his dissenting 
opinion in Allen, citing an article by Professor Mark Tushnet, an 
adherent to the Critical Legal Studies school of jurisprudence. 16 
philosophy of defining the function, scope and role of law and legal systems in society. See 
id. 
9 Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Foreword]. According to Judge 
Easterbrook, regulation is frequently inefficient, because people substitute their conduct to 
circumvent the regulation, and the regulator frequently does not have the capacity to regulate 
these substitutions "at the margin." /d. at 12. 
10 See generally Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) [hereinafter Posner, Economics]; Landes & Posner, The Inde-
pendent judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 j. L. & ECON. 875 (1975). 
II Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
592,592 (1984) [hereinafter Tribe, Constitutional Calculus]. 
12 Id. at 603. 
13 See generally Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note II. 
14 See Weisberg, The Calabresian judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 213, 239 (1983). 
15 See id. 
16 Allen, 468 U.S. at 782 n.1O (Brennan, j., dissenting) (citing Tushnet, The New Law of 
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977) [hereinafter Tushnet, The 
New Law of Standing]). 
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Justice Brennan proposes that "the Court's standing inquiry is no 
more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the 
underlying claims."17 Although the adherents of Critical Legal Stud-
ies have a broad range of views, they tend to examine the law 
critically to determine what motivates a judge's decision and what 
the concept of rights truly represents. IS 
Theories of jurisprudence help answer the following questions: 
What is the proper allocation of power in government? Who should 
have access to challenge governmental decisions and policies? What 
is the proper forum for such challenges? What level of accounta-
bility should the Court require from different levels of government? 
What are rights and what, if any, is the mechanism for enforcing 
them? When the Allen Court deferred to the constitutional alloca-
tion of powers as justification for denying standing to a group 
plaintiff asserting constitutional rights, it raised all of these issues. 
The presentation of these issues, the citation of different jurispru-
dential authorities and the postmortem debate between Judge Eas-
terbrook and Professor Tribe make the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Allen ideal ground for comparing theories of jurispru-
dence. . 
This Note compares the Law and Economics, New Legal Pro-
cess and Critical Legal Studies schools of jurisprudence and exam-
ines their relevance to the Allen decision. This Note addresses the 
implications of the different theories of jurisprudence for both the 
doctrine of standing and for the realization of the ideals that con-
stitutional rights seem to promise. Part II evaluates the Allen deci-
sion as an example of Law and Economics jurisprudence. Part III 
describes how Professor Tribe and the New Legal Process school 
might decide Allen. Part IV asks what the Critical Legal Studies 
school can add to this debate. In this fashion, the Note assesses the 
relevance of each theory'S assumptions and goals to the American 
constitutional system. 
II. LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. Maximizing Society'S Utility 
The Law and Economics school interprets the American legal 
system as a mechanism for resolving conflicts by reproducing con-
17 Allen, 468 U.S. at 782. 
18 See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983) [here-
in<!fter Unger, Critical Legal Studies]. . 
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ditions that parties would have bargained to achieve on their own. 19 
When the government regulates to prohibit various means of par-
ticipating in a desired activity, people will bargain and substitute to 
find an alternative means of participating in the activity.20 Regula-
tion may raise the cost of the activity but will not eliminate it, since 
elimination of all means of participation would be too costly.21 Min-
imizing restrictions on the freedom of private actors, by contrast, 
promotes efficiency by keeping governmental resources away from 
ineffectual restrictions. Law and Economics scholars, thus, aim to 
use the legal system to promote efficiency by minimizing inefficient 
regulation.22 
Law and Economics theorists define legal concepts and the 
role of the different branches of government so as to promote 
these goals.23 Two pIoneers of this theory, Judge Richard 
19 See, e.g., Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14]. L. &: ECON. 201 
(1971) (presenting an economic analysis to resolve the issues In Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 
657 (Iowa 1971)). 
20 See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 14 (citing Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
3]. L. &: ECON. 1 (1960)). 
21 See id. 
22 See Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 763-64 (1975); see also 
Easterbrook, Foreword, supm note 9, at 12 ("if legal rules can create larger gains ... the claim 
from fairness becomes weaker"). The resulting protection of private choices is central to Law 
and Economics theory. Eskridge &: Frickey, Legislation and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process 
Em, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 704 (1987). 
Keeping government froin interfering with individuals' abilities to use what capabilities 
they have to fulfill their wants appears to promote highly individualistic and libertarian 
values. Such values have deep roOtS in American political thought, originating with Thomas 
Jefferson. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO 
MADE IT 25-26 (Vintage Bks. ed. 1989). Law and Economics, thus, may draw support from 
those who maintain that American political rhetoric has never escaped the confines of 
individualism and that not even the rise of bureaucratic government in the twentieth century 
could extirpate this ideal. See genemlly R. HOFSTADTER, supra; see also Judis, Herbert Croly's 
Promise, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1989, at 84, 87. 
Individualism, however, is not necessarily incompatible with a more affirmative govern-
mental role. For instance, by focusing on "internal constraints on the choices of the self," 
government may "promot[e] ... the conditions of effective individuality." M. PHILLIPS, THE 
DILEMMAS OF INDIVIDUALISM: STATUS, LIBERTY, AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 
(1983). Society would seem to posit a role for government in occasionally constraining the 
liberty of some so that all may enjoy a more equal measure of liberty. See R. I?WORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266-78 (1977). Government may constrain an individual's liberty 
to prevent that individual from injuring another. Id. at 274. Government may also constrain 
liberty to effectuate the policy goals over which the community has achieved consensus or to 
prevent the community from dictating how some of its citizens should conduct their lives. 
Id. at 274-78. 
23 This "monocausal" view of the legal system bears some resemblance to the turn-of-
the-century legal science movement, which tried to discern scientific methods for deciding 
cases according to immutable principles. See R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
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Posner24 and Professor William Landes, advance a market theory 
of legislation. Under this theory, interest groups bidding on favor-
able legislation constitute the demand component of the market, 
while legislators' pursuit of potential votes, contributions and other 
benefits constitutes the supply component.25 To incorporate an issue 
into its platform, an interest group must surpass the costs of orga-
nization.26 If people feel that an issue does not affect them directly, 
they will have less incentive to organize and more incentive to let 
others resolve the issue.27 When an interest group pursues a gen-
eralized, broad-based policy, not only will the policy affect more 
opposing groups, but other groups with a positive but tangential 
interest will attempt to reap benefits from the policy initiative with-
out incurring the costs of joining a coalition-"free riding. "28 
Under this theoretical structure, small, narrowly-defined 
groups, often single-issue groups, will be most effective at achieving 
their policy goals.29 Public policy will include the occasional com-
promise between diverse groups,30 but will consist primarily of leg-
islation embodying narrow gains by small groups.31 These gains 
and occasional compromises collectively tend toward a maximi-
zation of overall societal wealth.32 Public policy is the equivalent 
of the equilibria ansmg from vanous political struggles.33 
AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 272 (1983); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 62 (1977); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 535 (1973). By taking the received 
common law and its arbitrary allocation of power as its normative base for developing the 
law, the legal science theory perpetuated those groups favored by the received order. R. 
STEVENS, supra, at 55. The Law and Economics school similarly favors the status quo by 
taking as its normative base human wants as measured by actions that are limited by the 
existing distribution of wealth and power. See Leff, Commentary-Economic Analysis of Law: 
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 462-63 (1974). 
24 Professors Eskridge and Frickey attribute most of the responsibility for the develop-
ment of a legal theory based on economics to Judge Posner. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra 
note 22, at 703. 
25 See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 877-79; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 
705. The Law and Economics school assumes that all decision-making units are selfish 
maximizers of wealth competing for the greatest gains. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 
22, at 703. 
26 Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 266. 
27 [d. 
28 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 705; Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 266; 
Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 877. 
29 Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 266. 
gO See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 705-06. 
31 The Law and Economics school theorists assert that public policy tends not to incor-
porate the public interest with its unpopular demands on societal wealth. Posner, Economics, 
supra note 10, at 266. 
g2 Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 266. 
33 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 703. 
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Public policy is, thus, ephemeral as well as non-rational and 
non-purposive.34 
Because the legislature is an elected body, Judge Easterbrook 
describes it as a "mechanism for aggregating preferences."35 The 
Law and Economics school posits the judiciary, by contrast, as a 
counter-majoritarian force that should defer to the political com-
promises of the legislature.36 The value of the judiciary lies in its 
ability to preserve the legislature's political compromises and, thus, 
to promote stability and continuity.37 Judge Easterbrook poses as a 
corollary that courts should interpret legislation narrowly, as con-
tracts between special interests, being careful not to infer rights of 
action.38 He asserts that courts should not "spur the other branches 
on to ever greater reconstitutions of society."39 
B. Constitutional Interpretation 
Judge Posner and Professor Landes view the Constitution as 
having two purposes: (1) it establishes the procedures for conduct-
34 Id. In the Law and Economics model, it is more appropriate for courts to conceive of 
legislation as a product of legislators' diverse motives rather than a single legislative intent. 
Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 272, 275. By minimizing the purpose of a law, courts 
will, thus, be poised to interpret it narrowly so as to refrain from interfering with private 
preferences. See Nagel & Nagel, Theory of Choice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, july 23, 1990, at 15, 
15-16. 
35 Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622, 627 (1985) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority]. 
36 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 707. The nomination and confirmation pmcess, 
however, results in some political control over the shaping of the judiciary. See generally L. 
TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985). Should the Supreme Court decide an area of law so as to 
undermine its popular legitimacy, Congress can, moreover, excise that area from the Court's 
jurisdiction. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 128 (1982). 
Article III of the Constitution provides that "the supreme Court shall have appellate juris-
diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
37 Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 878. The Law and Economics school claims that 
if courts do not adhere to this narrow role, they will lose their value and "the imposition by 
the current legislature of coercive measures that impair the courts' effective functioning will 
not be perceived as highly costly, and such measures will therefore be imposed more often." 
Id. at 885. 
38 Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 18. 
39 Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority, supra note 35, at 627. judge Easterbrook 
cites the arguments for judicial review in The Federalist and Marbury v. Madison as standing 
for the proposition that the judiciary's only function is to act as a brake on the other branches 
of government. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79 (A. Hamilton); 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803)). 
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ing interest group politics; and (2) it provides a special, durable 
type of legislation to those groups able to incur the substantial costs 
involved in obtaining passage of a constitutional provision.40 A con-
stitutional right is merely a device for "imparting durability to an 
initial legislative judgment protecting some group."41 Tension arises 
out of the contrast between the durable nature of this legislative 
bargain and both the institutional concern for a narrow judicial role 
and the desire to minimize inefficient legal regulation. 
Since large groups encounter significant difficulty in organizing 
to obtain favorable legislation,42 they stand to benefit the most from 
obtaining passage of a constitutional amendment.43 The durable 
gains in a constitutional amendment relieve the large group of 
having to reorganize periodically to protect short-term legislative 
gains.44 This argument interprets the Constitution as protecting any 
groups powerful enough to procure constitutional protection for 
their interests.45 Because the coalition that passes a constitutional 
amendment does not last indefinitely, Judge Posner argues that 
where constitutional rights are not clear, courts should construe 
them narrowly so as not to interfere with the preferences of the 
current majority.46 
Law and Economics theorists, drawing on a conservative tra-
dition, look to the Constitution's division of powers to justify a 
narrow role for the judiciary. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
and former circuit court Judge Robert Bork argue for limiting 
judicial intrusions into the prerogatives of the other branches of 
government. They assert that separation of powers concepts should 
playa significant role in deciding whether parties have standing to 
bring suits challenging other branches of government.47 Justice 
40 Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 892. 
41 [d. 
42 See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
43 Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 893. 
44 See id. 
45 [d. 
46 Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 282-85. This theory would not read the Consti-
tution so as to protect disenfranchised minorities that cannot attain the political strength 
necessary to achieve constitutional protection. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 893. 
47 See, e.g., Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 881 (1983) ("standing is a crucial and inseparable element of" 
separation of powers); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, j., dissenting) 
(because of separation of powers principles, standing should be denied to individual members 
of Congress suing the Executive Clerk of the White House, seeking an injunction against the 
President's use of the pocket veto), vacated, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). 
1991] JURISPRUDENCE AND RIGHTS 173 
Scalia maintains that such suits will convert the courts into "political 
forums."48 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Barnes v. Kline, 
Judge Bork stated that the only role for courts is to resolve disputes 
and that the "case" or "controversy" requirement of article III is 
not just a "convenient vehicle" for allowing courts to correct gov-
ernmental actions inconsistent with the Constitution.49 This ap-
proach to standing prevents losers in the political process from 
using the courts to overturn the legislature's bargains. 
For Law and Economics theorists, these article III concerns 
serve as a doctrinal basis for broader, economic concerns over the 
judiciary's institutional functioning. Judge Easterbrook argues that 
the inefficiency of judicial regulation should be a factor in the 
Court's standing calculus. He believes that the Court should restrain 
itself from making economically inefficient decisions that would 
intrude into the realms of other branches.50 Because of a burgeon-
ing caseload, the Supreme Court must expand its rule-making func-
tion to accommodate the cases it cannot now decide. 51 The Court, 
continues Judge Easterbrook, makes rules in an attempt to prevent 
future disputes by "seek[ing] to induce people to become informed 
or change their positions."52 To prevent conduct that would give 
rise to the future dispute, the Court must foresee all of the instances 
in which people might bargain and substitute to find alternative 
ways of engaging in the activity. 53 The Court must incur enormous 
costs in regulating each of these instances of possible bargaining 
and substitution. 54 The Law and Economics school will hesitate to 
enforce constitutional rights of minorities that are unclear in order 
to avoid this costly process. Where enforcement of these rights may 
involve the spheres of other branches of government, the Law and 
Economics school will favor denying standing. The principle of 
deference to durable bargains struck in constitutional amendments, 
thus, collides with these concerns for efficiency and for the insti-
tutional role of the judiciary. 
48 Scalia, supra note 47, at 892. 
49 759 F.2d at 52 (Bork, j., dissenting). Under article Ill's "case" or "controversy" 
requirement, for a case to be justiciable, there must be an adversarial dispute that the judiciary 
is capable of resolving without intruding on the prerogatives of the other branches of 
government. L. TRIBE, ACL, supra note 3, at 67. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
50 See generally Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 40-42. 
51 Id. at 6. 
52 /d. at 5. 
53 Id. at 14 (citing Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 j. L. & ECON. 1 (1960». 
54 See id. 
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C. Dispute-Resolution, Deference, Efficiency and Denial of Standing in 
Allen v. Wright 
The Allen decision displays several facets of the Law and Eco-
nomics model. 55 These facets include concern for the institutional 
role of the judiciary, 56 deference to the public policy equilibrium 
achieved in the political arena57 and an implicit awareness of the 
costs of judicial intervention. 58 The Court in Allen emphasized the 
role of separation of powers in the doctrine of standing, thereby 
limiting the potential for judicial transgressions with regard to these 
issues. 59 
The plaintiffs in Allen, a nationwide class, neither sought to 
have their children admitted to racially discriminatory private 
schools nor alleged denial of admission to such schools.60 Rather, 
they contended that the IRS's conferral of tax advantages to these 
schools resulted in a direct injury to them as well as "injury to their 
children's opportunity to receive a desegregated education."61 The 
55 See, e.g., id. at 40. 
56 Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 879; Scalia, supra note 47, at 892; Barnes v. 
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, j., dissenting). 
57 Cf Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 703. 
58 Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 41. 
59 468 U.S. at 746. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. The plaintiffs in Allen sought a stricter and nationwide version of a previous 
injunction against the IRS for the state of Mississippi. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 825 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (referring to injunction 
issued in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971)). The Internal Revenue 
Code provides private schools with an exemption from taxation. I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(3) 
(1990). The Code also provides deductions for all gifts to private schools. I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), 
170(c)(2)(B) (1990). Following the Green injunction, the IRS promulgated guidelines to de-
termine if a private school is discriminatory and, thus, ineligible for the exemption and 
deductions. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 824 n.7; see Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834; 
Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The district court consolidated Allen with the reopened 
Green case and then dismissed only the Allen case for want of standing. Wright v. Miller, 480 
F. Supp. 790,793 & n.l (D.D.C. 1979). 
The requested injunction would have barred exemptions and deductions on gifts to all 
private schools: 
"which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments, which are located in 
or serve desegregating public school districts, and which either -
(1) were established or expanded at or about the time the public school districts 
in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating; 
(2) have been determined in adversary judicial or administrative proceedings 
to be racially segregated; or 
(3) cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially segregated educational 
opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school 
systems .... " 
Allen, 468 U.S. at 747 (quoting App. 40). 
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IRS directly injured the plaintiffs by conferring benefits on racially 
discriminatory schools, "denigrat[ing] the standing and dignity of 
black Americans in their home communities."62 The conferral of 
tax advantages also injured the plaintiffs by "enhancing the degree 
to which discriminatory private schools can provide a haven for 
white children avoiding desegregating public schools."63 
For the Law and Economics school, however, when a group 
plaintiff seeks to enforce a broad right against the government, the 
claim is suspect as an interest group's attempt to gain in the courts 
what it failed to win in the legislature.64 Allowing such claims would 
impinge upon the aggregation of preferences in the legislative mar-
ketplace. Separation of powers concepts, thus, break down the 
nexus between the group plaintiff and the governmental defendant 
in evaluating the causation and redressability elements of standing. 
Justice O'Connor declared that the standing doctrine "is built 
on ... the idea of separation of powers,"65 relying upon Judge 
Bork's concurring opinion in Vander jagt v. O'Neill.66 Judge Bork 
believes that the only role of the courts is to decide disputes-not 
"to pronounce upon the law."67 Accordingly, a court should not 
62 Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d at 829 n.24. 
63 Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. at 794. 
64 Thus, the Court dismissed Allen even though a suit for an identical injunction confined 
within the State of Mississippi was able to proceed. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d at 822, 
826 (explaining Green v. Miller, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. May 5, 1971) (clarified and amended 
June 2, 1980»; see also supra note 61. Plaintiffs won the Mississippi injunction, resulting in 
different IRS policies in Mississippi and the rest of the United States. See Wright v. Regan, 
656 F.2d at 826. The Court's opinion seems to express concern over the national policy 
implications of Allen. It notes that plaintiffs did not identify any discriminatory schools 
allegedly receiving a tax exemption, but only identified four discriminatory schools operating 
"under the umbrella of a tax-exempt organization." Allen, 468 U.S. at 758 n.23. In dissent, 
however, Justice Brennan argued that the plaintiffs named thirty-two discriminatory private 
schools receiving tax benefits, twenty of which were in desegregating public school districts. 
[d. at 775 (Brennan, j., dissenting). He wrote that even if the Court were correct, denial of 
standing would be inappropriate, since "the proper disposition would be to remand in order 
to afford the respondents an opportunity to amend their complaint." [d. at 775-76 n.6. 
"' Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
66 Justice O'Connor quoted from Judge Bork's appellate opinion: 
"All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III-not only standing but mootness, 
ripeness, political question, and the like-relate in part, and in different though 
overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous 
and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of 
an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government." 
[d. at 750 (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, 
j., concurring)). 
67 Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, j., dissenting); see supra 
notes 30-32, and accompanying text. 
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indulge in defining the scope of legal rights if it does not confront 
an actual dispute between adversary parties. 58 
The Allen plaintiffs' claim is not judicially cognizable to a jur-
isprudential view holding the sole purpose of the judiciary to be 
the resolution of disputes between adversary individuals. Far from 
being a suit between two adversary individuals, Allen was a suit 
between a nationwide class of plaintiffs and a governmental 
agency. 59 Plaintiffs sought an injunction, not to change the conduct 
of the IRS toward them, but rather to change the IRS's conduct 
toward numerous third party school officials. 70 The Court viewed 
the complaint as a dispute between the plaintiffs and third parties 
not before the Court and as an effort to change national tax policy.7l 
Although there was sufficient allegation of injury,72 the Court, 
following its separation of powers analysis, ruled that the chain of 
causation was too weak.73 Despite the degree to which private 
schools rely on deductible charitable contributions, the Court could 
not link plaintiffs' alleged injuries to the tax benefit given to racially 
discriminatory schools.74 The majority was concerned that finding 
a direct chain of causation would open the door to suits challenging 
the policies and programs of agencies, thereby impinging on the 
constitutional separation of powers. 75 
In denying standing, the Court avoided a judicial intrusion into 
the executive branch. It also avoided upsetting a political bargain 
6" Barnes, 759 F.2d at 52. By limiting the judiciary'S involvement in the creation of public 
policy, the doctrine of standing "cushions the clash between the Court and any given legis-
lative majority .... " [d. at 53 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 116 
(1962». 
69 Allen, 468 U.S. at 743-45. 
70 See id. at 759. 
71 See id. 
72 [d. at 756. 
73 [d. at 759. 
74 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984). In his dissent, Justice Stevens found "a 
restatement of elementary economics" to provide a much more direct chain of causation: 
If racially discriminatory private schools lose the "cash grants" that flow from the 
operation of the statutes, the education they provide will become more expensive 
and hence less of their services will be purchased. Conversely, maintenance of these 
tax benefits makes an education in segregated private schools relatively more at-
tractive, by decreasing its cost. Accordingly, without tax-exempt status, private 
schools will either nol be competitive in terms of their cost, or have to change their 
admissions policies, hence reducing their competitiveness for parents seeking "a 
racially segregated alternative" to public schools, which is what respondents have 
alleged many white parents in desegregating school districts seek. 
[d. at 788 (Stevens, J, dissenting). 
75 [d. at 759. 
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struck in Congress. Following the commencement of Allen, the IRS 
proposed stricter guidelines for determining whether a school is 
discriminatory.76 Congress, however, responding to pressure from 
religious organizations,77 specifically prohibited the funding of any 
IRS attempt to tighten the requirements for private schools to qual-
ify for tax exemptions.78 Against this background, Justice O'Connor 
declared that '''raJ federal court ... is not the proper forum to 
press' general complaints about the way in which the government 
goes about its business. "79 
In reaching its conclusions, the Court relied on the type of 
efficiency and substitution analysis advocated by Judge Easterbrook 
suggesting that individuals prohibited by regulation from using a 
specific means to an end will simply choose another means to the 
same end.80 Thus, if the goal is to curtail circumvention of the 
76 Allen, 469 U.S. at 747-48 n.15 and accompanying text; see generally Proposed IRS 
Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter 
Hearings); 43 Fed. Reg. 37296 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 9451 (1979). 
77 On the pressure against new IRS guidelines, see Pine, IRS Softens Proposal Aimed at 
'Segregation Academies', Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1979, at A12, col. 4; L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1979 
§ 1, at 1, col. 2; Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1979, at A23, col. 1. 
78 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980 §§ 103, 
615, 93 Stat. 562, 577. Congress reinstated these restrictions for 1981. H.j. Res. 644, Pub. 
L. 96-536, §§ 101(a)(I), (4), 94 Stat. 3166, as amended by Supplemental Appropriations and 
Rescission Act of 1981, § 401, 95 Stat. 95. When the Court decided Allen, no spending 
restrictions were in force. Allen, 468 U.S. at 748 n.16. 
79 Allen, 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983». 
Economic analysis of tax grants, however, casts doubt on the claim that the government is 
not the real cause of the i~ury here. See S. SURREY, P. McDANIEL, H. AULT, S. KOPPELMAN, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 248 (suce. ed. 1986). 
[N)ow that (a) Congress has defined special tax provisions as spending programs, 
(b) both Congress and the executive branch publish lists of tax expenditures, and 
(c) tax committees are required to identify new tax expenditures, it is difficult to see 
how the courts could refuse to apply direct spending tests to tax expenditure 
provisions. 
Id. at 249. In testimony before a congressional hearing, W. Wayne Allen, the intervening 
defendant and chairman of one of the private school systems in dispute, stated that removal 
of tax benefits 
will be the demise of hundreds or maybe thousands of private schools. 
Private schools are heavily dependent on tax-free contributions. Our school is 
within this month raising $400,000 to build a new football stadium on tax deductible 
gifts. 
This would not be possible if this proposed regulation is passed. 
Hearings, supra note 76, at 388. Justice Stevens, recognizing this direct economic nexus, wrote 
that the injury in Allen is fairly traceable to tax benefits because subsidization of an activity 
"increase[s) ... the ability to engage in the activity." 468 U.S. at 786 (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
80 See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 40-41; see also supra notes 50-54 and 
accompanying text. A good example of this substitution is the "white flight" into private 
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attempt to desegregate public schools, removal of governmental 
support for private schools that aid this circumvention may result 
in little change as the schools seek other means of support such as 
higher tuition.8l Justice O'Connor observed these "substitutions at 
the margin,"82 noting that if the IRS removes favorable tax treat-
ment, it is "speculative" as to whether any school will change its 
policies.83 Even if discriminatory schools change their policies, these 
changes alone may not lead parents to send their children back to 
desegregating public schools.84 
In addition to the traditional standing requirement of stating 
an effective remedy, Judge Easterbrook's proposition and Justice 
O'Connor's opinion, thus, may add the requirement that the rem-
edy be efficient. The remedy requested by the Allen plaintiffs would 
be effective in terms of removing governmental support and its 
stamp of approval from discriminatory institutions. The remedy, 
however, is inefficient in that it allocates resources for an ostensible 
goal, ending "white flight" from desegregating public schools, the 
attainment of which is unlikely due to substitutions at the margin. 
Judge Easterbrook justifies the use of separation of powers to 
deny standing in Allen because of the enormous reallocation of 
resources that would supposedly follow from a ruling for the plain-
tiffs.85 He argues that a court cannot perform this reallocation 
schools to maintain segregation in education. See, e.g., Jordan, Free Ride on Tax Train Is Over 
for America's 'Seg Academies,' L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1979, § II, at 5, col. 1. 
81 Economic analysis can cut the other way as well. As tuitions rise, some students will 
have to return to public schools. See supra note 74. 
82 Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 40. 
83 Allen, 468 U.S. at 758. 
84 Id. 
85 Judge Easterbrook writes: 
[The Court] must be prepared to determine how vigorous the enforcement will be. 
(The plaintiffs attacked the supposed lack of enthusiasm and dispatch at the IRS, 
not the IRS's articulation of the legal rule.) To control the agency's vigor, the Court 
must allocate resources. It might say, for example, that the IRS should transfer 200 
agents from audits of drug stores to audits of private schools. It would need to 
impose deadlines and quotas (for instance: "review at least 10,000 cases annually, 
give monthly reports to the court and the plaintiffs, and justify your decisions in 
detail if you do not terminate the exemptions of 1,000 schools"). It might need to 
order the transfer of resources out of other programs. 
Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 41. 
Loopholes in regulation, however, may be grounds for more thorough regulation, catch-
ing the substitutions at the margin, as Judge Easterbrook seems to recognize. See id. at 40. 
Thus, a more efficient implementation of desegregation might have no regard for such 
arbitrary boundaries as city-suburb and public-private. Cf L. TRIBE, ACL, supra note 3, at 
1495 (criticizing the Court's prohibition of a metropolitan interdistrict busing plan in Milliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)). 
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efficiently, because it cannot see the IRS's "menu" of choices as 
circumscribed by the budget.86 Judge Easterbrook would, accord-
ingly, require a chain of causation much more direct than in Allen 
to justify such drastic intervention.87 
Justice O'Connor incorporated this argument when she cited 
the principle that "the Government has traditionally been granted 
the widest latitude in the 'dispatch of its own internal affairs."'88 
Justice O'Connor wrote: 
When transported into the Art. III context, that principle, 
grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels 
against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce 
specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, 
but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the 
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, 
after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial 
Branch, the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."89 
Justice O'Connor held that the monitoring of executive action is a 
congressional and not a judicial function. 90 Congress's prevention 
of the IRS's proposed changes in its guidelines may have influenced 
the Court here. 
The Allen Court held that the plaintiffs' injury-"their chil-
dren's diminished ability to receive an education in a racially inte-
grated school"-was judicially cognizable under the fourteenth 
amendment.9 ! In spite of this injury, the Court found the consti-
tutional system of separated powers and its implicit protection of 
the maximizations of political wealth made by the legislative and 
executive branches to be of paramount importance:92 The decision 
86 Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 41-42. 
87 [d. 
88 Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976) (quoting 
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 
886,896 (1961»))). 
89 [d. at 737 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); but see infra notes 204-05 and accom-
panying text. 
90 Allen, 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972». 
91 [d. at 756 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983». The Court characterized this type of injury as "one of 
the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system." [d. 
92 In Allen, finding causation may require adopting the perspective of the minority 
group, whose collective disadvantage results from a continued pattern of government-spon-
sored discrimination. The "monocausal" perspective of Law and Economics fails to see 
causation where the structures of government and society perpetuate inequities. The resulting 
underinclusive legal vision can promote injustice, as the feminist movement in legal thought 
has exposed how too often courts fail to take all relevant perspectives into account. See, e.g., 
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displays a keen sensitivity to the institutional role of the judiciary 
and to the inefficiency of judicial regulation. This result coincides 
with the Posner-Landes conclusion that the Constitution does not 
"protect the powerless, unrepresented elements of society. "93 
III. PUBLIC VALUES AND NEW LEGAL PROCESS 
A. Substance Through Process 
Professors Robert Weisberg, William Eskridge and Philip 
Frickey identify a legal theory that they call "New Legal Process."94 
The New Legal Process school starts with the premise that in ad-
dition to defining structures of government, "[t]he Constitution also 
identifies the values that will inform and limit this governmental 
structure."95 In the American constitutional system, judges have an 
active role in defining these public values.96 These scholars argue 
that confining judges to the enforcement of procedural rights97 
would deprive the Constitution of its meaning-a meaning with an 
inherent substantive content.98 The New Legal Process school rejects 
extreme deference to the legislature's political compromises and 
majoritarian decision-making.99 Many private decisions that repre-
sentative branches of government tend to voice will "perpetuate 
Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 16 
(1987). When the judiciary continually views cases with the same perspective, the outcomes 
of constitutional decisions may favor status quo interests. 1d. at 54-55. 
93 See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 893; see also supra notes 42-46 and accom-
panying text. 
94 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 717-25; Weisberg, supra note 14, at 239-49. 
New Legal Process builds on the Legal Process school of the 1950s, which focused on statutory 
and administrative sources of law, tracing the process through which public policy forms and 
seeking rational purposes to guide the interpretation of statutes. See R. STEVENS, supra note 
23, at 270-71; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 694-701. 
95 Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
1 (1979). 
96 Weisberg, supra note 14, at 241 (quoting Fiss, supra note 95, at 17). 
97 The'original Legal Process theory of interpreting statutes outlined the process through 
which policies generated and limited the judicial role to ensuring compliance with proper 
procedures and occasional "interstitial" lawmaking. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 
694-701. 
98 L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9-20 (1985) [hereinafter, L. TRIBE, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CHOICES); Weisberg, supra note 14, at 241. 
99 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 718. See also Fiss, supra note 95, at 15. Like the 
Law and Economics school, New Legal Process scholars rely upon the public choice critique 
of legislative decision-making to de-emphasize legislative intent and to lend normative sup-
port for their interpretive maxims. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, ACL, supra note 3, at 12 n.6; see also 
Nagel & Nagel, supra note 34, at 16. 
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undesirable social hierarchies" in light of the Constitution's substan-
tive values-particularly those private decisions based on race or 
gender discrimination. lOo 
To justify preference of substantive constitutional values over 
the legislature's aggregation of private preferences, New Legal Pro-
cess theorists interpret the Constitution as a device by which to 
control factions, rather than as a means for establishing factional 
dominance. lol Professor Cass Sunstein looks to James Madison's 
writings to support a process that promotes "deliberation and dia-
logue about the public good," rather than factionalism and interest 
group politics. lo2 The New Legal Process school sees this "dialogue 
about the public good" as an institutional constraint on judges that 
outlines the judges' role in defining public values. 103 These scholars 
see "law as a process by which we actualize our potential ... through 
... community discussion."lo4 Through this "dialogic" process, the 
legal system upholds substantive values. lOS 
On one level, dialogue exists between the branches of govern-
ment, shaping and reshaping public values. I06 The legislature 
"transform[s] private preferences," identified through the political 
process, into statements of public policy.lo7 Because the legislative 
100 Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 440 (1987). 
101 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 718; Sunstein, supra note 100, at 430-33. 
102 Sunstein, supra note 100, at 430-31 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison)). 
Professor Sunstein writes that "Madison believed that politics should not consist of a series 
of unprincipled trade-offs among self-interested factions." Id. at 431. 
103 See Weisberg, supra note 14, at 241-46. 
104 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 719. One objection is that the community from 
which New Legal Process derives the values relevant to constitutional interpretation appears 
to be a narrow elite. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 724-25. 
105 See Weisberg, supra note 14, at 239. In a similar vein, justice Brennan refers to 
Thomas jefferson's Dialogue Between My Head & My Heart to support a concept of judicial 
interpretation that balances reason with passion to guide an evolving Constitution. Brennan, 
Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law", 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 9 (1988) (citing T. 
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 874 (M. Peterson ed. 1984). Legal historian G. Edward White argues 
that there is a tradition in American law of popular conceptions of natural rights propelling 
through the structures of government until they reach the Supreme Court, whereupon they 
become constitutional law. See getlerally White, The Path of American jurisprudence, 124 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1212 (1976). Under this theory, legislatures, administrative agencies and trial courts 
respond to popular attitudes, and the Supreme Court eventually "constitutionalizes" these 
areas of nonconstitutional law, adopting the popular attitudes as constitutional values in the 
process. Id. 
Originalists, who claim that the framers intended a narrow and static Constitution, 
oppose the derivation of such broad interpretive maxims from the framers' writings. See, 
e.g., Berger, justice Brennan vs. The Constitution, 29 B.C.L. REV. 787 (1988); R. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 139-67,219-21 (1990). 
106 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 719. 
107 Id. 
182 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11: 165 
pronouncements may not reflect constitutional values accurately, 
the courts must intervene to "give our public morality an inner 
coherence."I08 The form of action a court takes determines how the 
legislature, in turn, can respond. 109 
The courts contribute to public policy by "interpret[ing] au-
thoritative statements of law ... in light of the underlying principles 
of the community."IIO Professor Tribe writes that there is a "consti-
tutive dimension" to this process. 1I1 "A court not only chooses how 
to achieve pre-existing ends, but also affects what those ends are to 
be and who we are to become."112 The public can evaluate judicial 
decisions according to their "contribution to the principled integrity 
of the community."113 
At another level, legal dialogue takes place between a court and 
the parties before it. 114 A judge interprets this communication 
through the institutional constraints surrounding the court, deriv-
ing the public values applicable to the resolution of disputes. 1 IS 
Professor Owen Fiss asserts that the institutional constraints on the 
judiciary,116 including an uncontrollable agenda, the flow of infor-
108 Fiss, supra note 95, at 13-14; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 720. Judge 
Bork counters with the argument that regardless of deficiencies the legislature may have in 
aggregating individual preferences, it still performs that function better "than a majority of 
a committee of nine lawyers sitting in Washington." R. BORK, supra note 105, at 201. 
109 See Weisberg, supra note 14, at 244. A court can interpret broadly or narrowly with 
varying degrees of deference to legislative history; it can carry out the harsh results of a 
legislative action in an effort to force the legislature to respond; or it can remand to the 
legislature by dismissing for want of jurisdiction. Id. A "landscape of legal principle," which 
includes legislative statements, however, constrains the court's options. Id. 
lID Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 721-22. How far can the meaning of the 
Constitution expand under this theory? Different jurisprudential views combine to pose this 
challenge. Critical Legal Studies scholar Mark Tushnet cynically writes that when asked how 
he would decide a case, he responds that he would reach an outcome that would promote 
socialism and ground the language of the opinion in "some currently favored version of 
Grand Theory." Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424 
(1981) [hereinafter Tushnet, Dilemmas]. Judge Bork writes that "Tush net is at least candid 
about the fact that he would as a judge make a political decision and then deceive us. But 
also implicit in his statement is his confidence that Grand Theory can be made to reach any 
result. Indeed it can." R. BaRK, supra note 105, at 214. 
III Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note II, at 595. 
112 Id. 
113 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 719 (citing R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 209-11 
(1986». 
114 See Weisberg, supra note 14, at 241-42. 
115 See id.; Fiss, supra note 95, at 13. 
116 According to Professor Fiss: 
(a) Judges are not in control of their agenda, but are compelled to confront griev-
ances or claims they would otherwise prefer to ignore. (b) Judges do not have full 
control over whom they must listen to. They are bound by rules requiring them to 
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mation in the adversary system and the responsibility to respond to 
claims and justify decisions, assure a principled enunciation of pub-
lic policy. 1 17 
Professor Bruce Ackerman focuses on parties' statements of 
facts a~ an element of the dialogue between courts and litigants. 1 IS 
Professor Ackerman argues that, given the growth of what he calls 
"activist government,"1l9 "the lawyer must ... develop a structural 
statement of the facts that reveals the ways an activity might be 
feasibly reorganized to avoid or ameliorate the inefficiencies and in-
justices [the activity] may be generating."120 Professor Ackerman 
welcomes the Law and Economics school's contribution of efficiency 
analysis to the legal conversation, but he finds economics language 
incomplete without a consideration of injustices. 121 For instance, the 
Court's mandate in Brown v. Board of Education II that public schools 
desegregateI22 shows that efficiency does not rank as the highest 
priority in the American legal system. I23 Brown II mandates that 
listen to a broad range of persons or spokesmen. (c) Judges are compelled to speak 
back, to respond to the grievance or the claim, and to assume individual responsi-
bility for that response. (d) Judges must also justify their decisions. 
[d. See also Weisberg, supra note 14, at 242. 
117 The New Legal Process school's conception of the legal system mixes natural rights 
with the constraints of positivist, structured governmental processes. Eskridge & Frickey, 
supra note 22, at 725. The natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas held that societal rules 
imitate moral principles discernible from divine law. See M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
30-33 (1975). By contrast, the positive law theory of John Austin defines law as the commands 
of the sovereign, regardless of morality. See id. at 24-29. New Legal Process, thus, benefits 
from legal philosophers' positing of a natural and positive law mix. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 188-89, 199-200 (1961) (recognizing the role of morality in consti-
tutional interpretation within a positive law legal system). Perhaps more apposite is a theory 
that analogizes law to a chain novel, equating new legal decisions and developments to new 
chapters written along the different perspectives of many authors. See Eskridge & Frickey, 
supra note 22, at 722; R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986). 
Practically, New Legal Process receives support from the Declaration of Independence's 
assertion of "unalienable Rights" (The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776)) and 
the Constitution's structures, which define both governmental processes and individual rights. 
This view contrasts with Law and Economics, which tends to de-emphasize the Constitution's 
substantive content in deference to its allocations and procedures. 
118 Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1084 (1983). 
119 The term "activist state" describes the modern form of government, spawned by the 
New Deal and typified by the penetration of administrative agencies into myriad facets of 
everyday life. See id. at 1083-84. 
1.0 [d. at 1089 (emphasis added). 
1.1 See id. at 1120-21. 
I" 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown II, the Court mandated abolishment of legally enforced 
apartheid within public schools. [d. at 298. 
1.3 Ackerman, supra note 118, at 1120-21; see also L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, 
supra note 98, at 357 n.249 ("Recognition that majoritarian political processes cannot be 
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courts address structural, as well as individual, injustices. 124 Thus, 
inefficiency, injustice and struc~ural reform are all a part of the legal 
vocabulary that develops public values through legal "conversa-
tions."125 
B. Identifying Proper Participants in the Legal Conversation 
In his writing on structural injunctions, Professor Owen Fiss 
notes that only non-traditional forms of litigation can remove 
threats to constitutional values in large scale organizations. 126 Pro-
fessor Fiss argues that in school desegregation cases the real victims 
are a larger group than just black children. 127 Such a large group 
can better represent the claim than an individual, who "must be a 
minor hero to stand up and challenge the status quo .... "128 The 
oiltcome of the litigation affects groups as a whole-not just named 
parties. 129 
For Professor Fiss, the standing test should focus on whether 
the spokesperson before the court adequately represents the 
group.130 On the defendant's side of the litigation, the named party 
may not adequately represent all of the potentially implicateQ par-
ties with differing interests. 131 To insure the fullest degre~ of ad-
relied on to protect the basic rights of all citizens is at the core of modern theories of judicial 
review" (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938))). 
124 See Ackerman, supra note 118, at 1120-21. Brown II mandated a change from an 
educational structure promoting apartheid to a structure of desegregation. See Brown II, 349 
U.S. 294 (1955). The injustice in Brown is not against a specific individual. The injustice is 
the government-enforced structure of apartheid, which impinges upon blacks as a group. 
. 125 See Ackerman, supra note 118, 'It 1126. Structural reform poses the problem of 
impinging upon the Law and Economics conception of individualism, although it does so to 
promote a more equal participation in liberty and, thus, perhaps an alternative conception 
of individualism. Sel! supra note 22. In the twentieth century, however, other values may be 
tempering the individualism of the American charactet: See Waizer, Socialism Then and Now, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1989, at 75, 76 (poirtting to the noncontroversial character of 
numerous "safety nets" of the modern administrative stille as evidence of some degree of 
collective responsibility underpfnning the American system of government); see'generally D. 
REISMAN, N. GLAZER & R. DENNEY, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMER-
ICAN CHARACTER (1953) (positing the American character as having transformed with post-
industrialization from "inner-directed" and individu'llistic to "other-directed" andconcen-
trated on social groups); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (tracing the gradual 
merger of tort and contract law, impinging greater responsibilities on individuals, which may 
hinder pursuit of private preferences). 
126 Fiss, supra note 95, at 17. 
127 [d. at 19. 
128 [d. 
129 [d. at 21-22. 
130 See Fiss, supra note 95, at 20. 
131 [d. at 25. 
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verseness, the judge should invite all interested and relevant parties 
to participate-either by joining the suit as parties or by filing amici 
cllriae briefs. 132 
In response to concerns about whether this model would en-
danger or transcend the judiciary's traditional institutional role, 
Professor Fiss argues that although the Constitution provides a 
formal separation of powers between the branches of government, 
it neither requires this separation to be functional nor confines any 
branch to a single function. 133 He maintains that the Constitution 
does not require federal courts to adhere to a traditional' dispute-
resolution model. 134 
Professor Cass Sunstein explores the ways in which the rise of 
an administrative branch of government has createp new problems 
of factionalism. He argues that one of the great failures of the New 
Deal reforms has been the exemption of administrative agencies 
from checks and balances. 135 Administrative agencies, largely free 
from control by either the President or the Congress, lack account-
ability both to the electorate and to the three branches of govern-
ment. 136 
Although administrative agencies may declare preferences with 
regard to public policy, only courts have the institutional qualities 
necessary to inform the dialogic process that "give[s] meaning to 
public ... values."137 In this respect, the New Legal Process theory 
opposes Judge Easterbrook's contention that the courts should not 
"spur the other branches" of government to "reconstitute" society. 138 
132 Id. at 26. The New Legal Process school"s focus on the problem of multiple perspec-
tives in structural injunction cases seems appropriate given the growing diversity of American 
society. 
133 See Fiss, supra note 95, at 32. But see supra note 47. 
134 See Fiss, supra note 95, at 32. Although dispute-resolution has alternative forums 
such as arbitration, structural reform cases have no alternative other than the courts. Id. at 
33. Even administrative agencies, likely alternatives, lack the institutional constraints that 
enable the judiciary to give meaning to constitutional values. Id.at 35. 
135 Sunstein. supra note 100, at 443. Professor Sunstein writes: 
The ptoblem of faction ... has played a central role in administrative law in the 
last two decades. The absence of either true insulation or electoral safeguards has 
made administrators susceptible to the influence of well-organized private groups. 
Findings of agency "capture" are common .... The ultimate concern is one of 
lawmaking by private groups .... 
See id. at 448-49. 
136 See id. 
137 See Weisberg, supra note 14, at 240-41 (quoting Fiss, supra note 95, at 17); Eskridge 
& Frickey, supra note 22, at 719; Fiss, supra note 95, at 13. 
138 See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 
11, at 595. 
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The New Legal Process school sees the courts as providing a foun-
dation in constitutional values for communication between the 
branches of government over the realization of rights. 
C. Allen v. Wright: Interrupting the Conversation 
An examination of the history of the rights at stake in Allen 
provides an excellent example of how public policies arise by dif-
ferent branches of government spurring each other to act, with the 
Supreme Court taking a prominent role as the interpreter of con-
stitutional values. In 1954, the Supreme Court held in Brown v. 
Board of Education l39 that the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment forbids government-enforced segregation in 
public education. 140 Congress responded to the Court by declaring 
a policy of nondiscrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.141 
Congress, however, also had declared a policy of providing tax-
exempt privileges to charitable institutions, including private 
schools. 142 As Representative Sam Gibbons noted during the 1979 
hearings on proposed revisions in the IRS's procedures, the Court 
reconciled these values by holding "that certain conditions must be 
imposed, including nondiscriminatory policies, as the price for win-
ning tax-exempt status and the assistance it provides."143 
In 1 965, the IRS responded to judicial and legislative pro-
nouncements of public policy by re-examining the impact of tax-
exempt status on racially discriminatory private schools. 144 In 1967, 
the IRS announced "that racially discriminatory private schools re-
ceiving State aid were not entitled to tax-exempt status."145 In 1 971, 
a three-judge panel of the District of Columbia District Court in 
Green v. Connally extended this policy to preclude tax-exempt status 
for all racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi. 146 That 
year, the IRS responded to the district court's injunction by declar-
139 347 U.S. 4il3 (1954). 
140 [d. at 495. 
141 See Hearings, supra note 76, at 1 (remarks of Rep. Sam Gibbons (chairperson)). 
142 [d. 
143 [d. (general summary of the courts' response to the policy of nondiscrimination 
declared in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988))). 
144 See Hearings, supra note 76, at 3 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue) (discussing 1965 re-examination of policy). 
145 [d. (citing IRS News Release, August 2, 1967). 
146 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D. D.C. 1971), afl'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 
(1971). See Hearings, supra note 76, at 4 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). 
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ing a general nondiscrimination policy, and, in 1972, the IRS pub-
lished guidelines for private schools to follow. 147 
During the early 1970s, the Supreme Court further clarified 
the right to freedom from government-sponsored discrimination 
by granting injunctions in three cases challenging governmental 
assistance to racially discriminatory third parties. 148 Professor Tribe 
reads these cases as not requiring "a precise causal relationship" for 
standing. 149 He notes that the Court has cited its summary affirm-
ance in Green as supporting the proposition that "[t]his Court has 
consistently affirmed decisions enjoining State tuition grants to stu-
dents attending racially discriminatory private schools."150 The 
Green Court treated the grant of tax-exempt status to racially dis-
criminatory private schools as the equivalent of "a forbidden tuition 
grant."151 
Professor Tribe also argues that Congress endorsed the Green 
decision by adding § 501(i) to the Internal Revenue Code. 152 This 
section prohibits tax-exemptions for social clubs that "discriminat[e] 
against any person on the basis of race, color, or religion."153 Pro-
fessor Tribe cites the Senate Report for § 501 (i) as affirming that 
Green remains good law for § 501(c)(3) institutions and as attempting 
to bring social clubs under the same rule. 154 
In response to criticism from the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, the IRS required private schools to adopt formally and to 
make public a nondiscriminatory policy in order to retain tax-ex-
empt status. 155 The Green plaintiffs reopened their case, however, 
to challenge the efficacy of the IRS's measures and to seek an 
147 Hearing, supra note 76, at 4 (citing Rev. Rul. 71-447,1971-2 C.B. 230 and Rev. Proc. 
72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834). 
148 See supra note 6. These three cases include the Supreme Court's affirmance of Green 
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C. 1971). 
149 Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 11, at 604 n.72 (discussing Gilmore v. City 
of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) and Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973)). 
150 Hearings, supra note 76, at 367 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, 
Harvard University (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463)). 
151 [d. Each form of economic assistance provides governmental support in violation of 
the Constitution. According to Professor Tribe, the courts have interpreted the Constitution 
to prohibit "the extension of economic benefits with public funds, direct or indirect, including 
through the vehicle of a tax benefit, to racially discriminatory institutions, private or public." 
!d. at 366. 
152 [d. at 370. 
153 [d. (quoting I.R.C. § 501 (i)). 
154 [d. at 371 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-1318, 1976-2 C.B. 597, 601 n.5). 
155 Hearings, supra note 76, at 4 (statement of Jerome Kurtz) (citing Rev. Proc. 75-50, 
1975-2 C.B. 587). 
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injunction for more effective guidelines. 156 The Allen plaintiffs 
sought the same injunction on a nationwide basis. 157 The IRS Com-
missioner agreed that the guidelines were "ineffective,"158 as the 
Allen plaintiffs underscored by naming thirty-two discriminatory 
private schools with tax-exempt status in their complaint. 159 
Up to this point, a clear policy of a right to freedom from the 
incidents of any governmental sponsorship of discriminatory insti-
tutions was emerging from communication between the litigants, 
the judiciary and the other branches of government. 160 This process, 
however, soon ended. Two events signaled the end. First, Congress 
prevented the IRS from adopting more effective guidelines. 161 
Next, the Court invoked the separation of powers doctrine and 
denied the Allen plaintiffs standing. 162 These actions left the Allen 
plaintiffs without a remedy for what the Court conceded was "one 
of the most serious injuries recognized in Qur legal system."163 
Judge Easterbrook accurately reads a cost-benefit analysis164 
into the Court's reluctance to "restructur[e] ... the apparatus 
established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties."165 
Professor Tribe, however, argues that the Brown v. Board of Education 
II command to desegregate public schools accomplished much with-
out putting "a federal judge in the principal's office."166 In contrast 
156 Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 825 (D.D.C. 1981). 
157 Id. See supra note 61 for the text of the injunction sought. 
158 Hearings, supra note 76, at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). According to Commissioner 
Kurtz, in spite of existing guidelines, "a number of private schools continue to hold tax 
exemption, even though they have been held by Federal courts to be racially discriminatory." 
Id. 
159 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 775 (1984) (Brennan,]., dissenting) (citing Complaint 
~~ 24-27, 45, App. 26-27, 35-36). 
160 The evolution of the rights contested by the Allen plaintiffs, through litigation and 
action taken by Congress and the IRS, indicates that the dialogic approach may accurately 
describe the way constitutional rights come to realize their full potential in a modern world. 
But see]. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
(1971) (an empirical study during the early years of desegregation of the willingness and 
effectiveness of courts in utilizing their institutional advantages to further the development 
of equal protection, portraying a few successes amid many obstacles). 
161 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
162 Allen, 468 U.S. at 761. 
163 Id. at 756. 
164 Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 9, at 41. 
165 Allen, 468 U.S. at 761; see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text (describing how 
the Court has inadequate resources to meet the costs of regulating an activity so thoroughly 
as to catch all behavioral substitutions at the margin). 
166 Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note 11, at 604 (discussing Brown 1/, 349 U.S. at 
294); but see Scales-Trent, A Judge Shapes and Manages Institutional Reform: School Desegregation 
in Buffalo, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. Be Soc. CHANGE 119 (1989) (describing the large role a judge 
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to the Brown command, which addressed thousands of schoQI 
boards, the injunction sought in Allen would have addressed only a 
single agency.!67 In the New Legal Process system, placing effi-
ciency-in this case, efficient management of a governmental 
agency-above all other values affronts the Constitution.!68 
Allen involved the outer boundaries of equal protection!69 and 
presented nationwide policy implications. It is, thus, the type of case 
in which Law and Economics theorists would invoke their canon of 
narrow interpretation in order to avoid interfering with the aggre-
gation of private preferences by the elected branches.!70 If Con-
gress's actions!7! did influence the Court, the New Legal Process 
school would object to the Court's deference to factionalism at the 
expense of constitutional values. 
Whether the motivating factor was fear of the judiciary'S in-
ability to regulate the IRS's policy or deference to congressional 
control in this area, the Allen Court displayed a great concern for 
must play to implement desegregation successfully). On the difficulties in implementing 
desegregation, see generally Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); J. 
LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIES 
(1985). 
167 Tribe, Constitutional Calculus, supra note II, at 604. Judge Easterbrook's assumption 
that effective relief would require a judicial takeover of the IRS seems somewhat unrealistic. 
Id. at 603-04. 
168 See Ackerman, supra note 118, at 1120-21. Professor Ackerman writes: "Rather than 
serving as an alternative to 'distributional' judgments, 'efficiency' is just one way of talking 
about the distribution of costs and benefits imposed by the legal system, and an obviously 
inadequate way of making sense of our existing legal system." ~d. (emphasis in original). The 
Supreme Court has stated that efficiency should not trump constitutional rights. See, e.g., 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (noting that the equal protection clause 
prohibits state use of gender discrimination solely to achieve "administrative efficiency" and 
citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). In another setting, the Court's jurisprudence 
has suggested that the separation of powers doctrine is designed to promote inefficiency 
rathet than efficiency, so as to prevent arbitrary exercises of power that might endanger 
rights and liberties. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52. 293 (1926) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). . 
169 Section I of the fourteenth amendment provides that "No State shall ... deny to 
apy person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1. 
170 See Posner, Economics, supra note 10, at 282-85. 
1?1 Congress had achieved an equilibrium here when it prohibited funding of lRS 
proposals to tighten guidelines for determining if discrimination disqualifies schools from 
tax benefits. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. The District of Columbia District 
Court denied standing in deference to this political deal. See Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 
790,798-99 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that congressionalspending restrictions on IRS preclude 
judicial action). When the Court ruled on Allen, the congressional restrictions had expired, 
and the Court did not address their significance for precluding judicial relief. See Allen, 468 
U.S. at 748 n.16. 
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the institutional role of the judiciary in a system of separated pow-
ers. Professor Sunstein writes that the Allen Court's suggestion that 
"probabilistic or systemic injuries created by tax deductions" are not 
judicially cognizable is a "misguided approach to the Constitution 
and the judicial role."172 The Constitution's allocation of the duty 
of executing the laws to the executive branch does not authorize 
administrative agencies to violate constitutional rights through di-
rect action. 173 Accordingly, administrative agencies should not be 
able to invoke the constitutional scheme for allocation of power to 
defend violations of constitutional rights through inaction. 174 
Thus, for the New Legal Process school, definition, interpre-
tation and enforcement of constitutional values are of paramount 
concern. 175 In deciding Allen, New Legal Process scholars would 
trace the evolution, through the dialogic process, of a right to 
freedom from government-sponsored incidents of desegregation. 
They probably would conclude that the logical extension of this 
process would recognize a nexus between the plaintiffs and the IRS 
sufficiently tight to satisfy the causation and redressability elements 
of standing. 
IV. CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
A. Deconstructing the Legal Order 
The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) school identifies the Law and 
Economics and New Legal Process schools as variants of longstand-
ing and opposed traditions in the law. 176 Professor Duncan Ken-
nedy, a leading "Crit," equates conservative legal thought (the cur-
rent variant of which is Law and Economics) with "individualism," 
or a self-interested attitude opposing help from others in defining 
individual objectives and favoring the individual's entitlement to the 
fruits of that individual's efforts. 177 On the other hand, Professor 
Kennedy views liberal legal thought (the current variant of which 
is New Legal Process) as "altruism," or the preference of self-sac-
172 Sunstein, supra note 100, at 476. 
m [d. 
17. [d. 
175 See generally Fiss, supra note 95. 
176 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 711 ("The central dilemma in our constitutional 
system arises from the fact that on most issues the polity is committed both to majority rule 
and to the protection of minority rights"). 
177 Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1713, 1713 n.74. 
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rifice for others and redistribution of wealth. 178 Because "there is 
no neutral way to draw the line between majority rule and minority 
rights"179 in any given situation, jurists try to conform completely 
to one or the other school's utopian scheme in order to avoid 
making political decisions. 18o 
Another leader of the CLS movement, Professor Roberto Un-
ger, assesses traditional jurisprudence by deconstructingl81 formalist 
and objectivist tendencies in the law. He defines formalism as "a 
commitment to," and "belief in the possibility of," finding nonideo-
logical, nonpolitical and impersonal principles for deciding the 
law. 182 He describes objectivism as "an intelligible moral order," 
whereby "laws are not merely the outcome of contingent power 
struggles or of practical pressures lacking in rightful authority."183 
Formalism presupposes objectivism as a moral order from which 
jurists can derive a self-contained system of policies and justifica-
tions. 184 
Law and Economics, thus, may build its objective moral order 
on deference to private preferences, while New Legal Process looks 
to the values implicit in rights such as equal protection. From their 
respective moral orders, each school derives formalistic theories of 
how to decide cases. 185 Law and Economics orders its legal hierarchy 
around the market, and New Legal Process strains to find a rela-
tionship between moral values and the received legal order.186 CLS 
scholars contend that judges cannot ignore the inherently value-
laden choice between these competing world views that every "oc-
casion for lawmaking" presents. 187 Judicial attempts to identify le-
gitimate means and ends are, thus, mere "retrospective glosses on 
decisions that had to be reached on quite different grounds."188 
178 [d. at 1717. 
179 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 71i. 
180 Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1722, 1766; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 
71i. 
181 The term deconstruction implies dismantling an object that achieved its present state 
through a mechanical construction rather than through "organic" growth. See Lurie, A 
Dictionary for Deconstructors, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 23,1989, at 49 (discussing literary decon-
structionists). 
182 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 564. 
183 [d. at 565. 
184 [d. at 565-66. 
185 See id. at 574. 
186 [d. at 574-75. 
187 Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1766. 
188 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 569. 
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. Professor Unger argues that a critique of the law should derive 
from a theory independent of the legal system and that a formalist 
critique of current law is flawed in its reliance on the received legal 
order.189 By critiquing legal developments based on the past body 
of law, Professor Unger argues that a formalist analysis amounts to 
"sanctification of the actual," limiting opportunities to transform 
the legal system. 190 Critiquing a legal system without a normative 
base independent from that legal system results in perpetuation of 
the status quo. 
Proponents of individualism and altruism have each gained 
some victories in the political realm that the opposing interest had 
linked to numerous evils l91-evils that never occurred. 192 Neither 
interest, however, can achieve a meaningful portion of its agenda 
through politics. 193 Professor Unger argues that this deadlock has 
its roots in an inefficierit constitutional system that deflates inno-
vative programs of their momentum by filtering them through a 
scl;teme of 'checks and balances and separated powers-a scheme of 
alleged safeguards infiltrated by factions. 194 The system of checks 
and balances and separated powers, however, does not prevent 
accumulation of power in factories, bureaucracies, offices, hospitals 
apd schools. This accumulation insulates these institutions from 
accountability to democratic ideals. 195 Professor Unger proposes 
comparing existing institutions, structures and rights to "ideals of 
democracy" and working toward establishment of institutions that 
189 [d. at 571. 
190 [d. 
191 Examples are restraints on the market system or policies favoring business instead 
of labor. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1722. 
192 [d. 
193 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 590-91; see also Kennedy, supra note 
18, at 1722. 
194 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 590; R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-
NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 455 (1987) [herein-
after R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY]. Professor Unger states that: 
Because of the system of checks and balances, a faction bent on an ambitious 
program mUst capture more or less simultaneously the different departments of 
government. And the leaders of each branch of government can usually be counted 
on to be 'so jealous of the prerogatives of their offices that pride of place becomes 
identical with resistance to every bold plan. Indeed, the most noticeable feature of 
the ~yste~ is to establish a rough equivalence between the transformative reach of 
a political project and the obstacles that the constitutional machinery sets in its way. 
R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITy,SUpra, at 455. 
195 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 589. 
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will allow greater experimentation and the elimination of biases 
from policy-making. 196 
B. Deconstructing Equal Protection 
Critical Legal Studies scholars often criticize rules and rights as 
not being "natural, an~ necessary, and just," contrary to their pres-
entation. 197 One critic of CLS argues that in CLS's view "[ r lights 
legitimize society's unfair power arrangements, acting like pressure 
196 Id. at 588; R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 194, at 455 ("a theory that wants 
to show all the ways in which a contingent, revisable institutional order forms the occasions 
and instruments of conflict and shapes assumptions about identities, interests, and possibili-
ties"). An ultimate goal may be the replacement of separated powers with a hierarchical 
system whereby each branch has absolute authority over the branches below it, and each 
branch has priority according to the political mandate of its members and according to "how 
far into the social order its cel1tral constitutional responsibilities allow it to reach." R. UNGER, 
FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 194, at 456. The importance to the public of the policy issues 
over which an institution has jurisdiction would, thus, determine the power of that institution. 
Another goal may be the promotion of socialist ideals. See Tushnet, Dilemmas, supra note 110, 
at 424. 
CLS, thus, contrasts the received legal order with a vision of natural justice. See Eskridge 
& Frickey, supra note 22, at 724; see also supra note 117. CLS evolved out of the spirit of the 
early twentieth century Realist school of jurisprudence, which exposed rules as positive, 
contingent and unjustifieq. See Schlegal, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate 
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 405-07 (1984). CLS's 
criticisms carry the powerful sting of observations of inequities and breakdowns in the 
American system of law and government during the 1960s. These observations relate par-
ticularly to civil rights, the Vietnam War and corruption in government. Eskridge & Frickey, 
supra note 22, at 713. 
CLS should encounter major problems in gaining popular acceptance for such fPassive 
destabilization. Stephen Presser's and Jamil Zairialdin's questioning of the Realist movement 
is applicable pere. They ask: "Could one expect a republic to be governed by laws that are 
inherently uncertain? Is it too much to expect a populace, or even most lawyers, to accept a 
legal world in which then~ is no one, no thing, or no idea permanently at the helm?" S. 
PRESSER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 771 (2nd ed. 1989). While Professor Unger answers these questions through his vision 
of a hierarchical governmental structure, the authoritarian specter that hierarchical govern-
ment raises poses problems of its own. Professor Unger also protests that the "extreme and 
almost paradoxical volu~tari~m" required by Critical Legal Studies is not so farfetched, 
because its aims are in accordance with the best of liberal democratic goals inherent in 
western democracy. Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 586. 
These problems are reducible to a common objection to all theories of natural law: claims 
by any individual or small group to have discovered true morality are suspect. Professor 
Arthur Leff asks: "who ultimately gets to play the role of ultimately unquestionable evaluator, 
a role played in supernaturally based systems by God? Who among us ... ought to be able 
to declare 'law' that ought to be obeyed?" Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE 
L.J. 1229, 1233 (1979) (emphasis in original). 
197 Are Lawyers Really Necessary? Barrister Interview with Duncan Kennedy, 14 BARRISTER 10, 
12 (Fall 1977) [hereinafter Interview]. 
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valves to allow only so much injustice."198 Professor Unger offers a 
similar deconstruction of equal protection. 
Professor Unger argues that underlying the equal protection 
doctrine is an individualistic view that, in most cases, "individuals 
can escape confinement to a disadvantaged group" without govern-
mental assistance. 199 In the few instances where "collective inferi-
ority" is deep enough, however, there is insufficient access to the 
political process to remedy oppression.20o In these instances, equal 
protection prevents the government from using membership in a 
group as a legal category to reinforce disadvantages. 201 
Professor Unger maintains that this "underlying view" is an 
inaccurate portrayal of society. He argues that rigidity of class struc-
tures, misrepresentation in politics and bias prevent the political 
system from fulfilling its proper corrective function. 202 The in-
stances of severe collective disadvantage, moreover, are far more 
widespread than perceived by the "underlying view."203 If the ju-
diciary were to address all of these instances, it would become 
embroiled in the "censorial superpolitics" of restructuring society. 204 
Professor Unger would replace the equal protection system 
with a system of "destabilization rights," or claims against govern-
mental institutions to remove those institutions from "transforma-
tive confiicts."205 In dealing with collective disadvantage, these des-
tabilization rights would pertain to all categorizations made 
according to membership in groups.206 They would operate either 
by invalidating laws or by "disrupt[ing] power orders in particular 
institutions or localized areas of social practice."207 
198 Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want? 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 303-04 (1987). Some find this attack on the legitimacy of 
rights disconcerting. Minority groups, in particular, claim that informal systems of order, 
such as the ones "Crits" tend to propose, often encourage racism and are inappropriate to 
minority needs. See generally Delgado, supra; Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal 
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Williams, Alchemical Notes: 
Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); Note, 
The Schism Between Minorities and the Critical Legal Studies Movement: Requiem for a Heavyweight?, 
supra at 137. 
199 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 606. 
200 Id. See also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
201 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 606. 
202 Id. at 607-08. 
203 See id. at 608. 
204 See id. at 608-09. 
205 Id. at 612. 
206 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 612. 
207 Id. at 613. 
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This institutional disruption of power is an extension of the 
structural injunctions of the type at issue in Allen.208 Professor Un-
ger sees the judiciary as poorly suited to engage in this type of 
massive restructuring of society.209 He argues that incremental re-
form in the current system of rights will not bring about this massive 
restructuring.2lO 
Professor Unger, nonetheless, qualifies this dismal portrayal by 
writing that his vision may have exemplary value for critiquing and 
shaping the development of the actual equal protection doctrine. 211 
Some type of device similar to the structural injunction figures 
prominently in Professor Unger's reconstructed society. In his 
scheme of hierarchy, transformation and destabilization, Professor 
Unger analogizes large-scale structural injunctive relief to giving 
priority to "the organization of government and of conflict over 
governmental power" in order to "provide a suitable institutional 
setting for every major kind of practical or imaginative activity of 
transformation. "212 
C. Deconstructing Standing 
Professor Unger's willingness to proceed with a development 
of the law based on his vision of reconstructed society, despite some 
trepidation over the institutional capacities of the judiciary, suggests 
that Critical Legal Studies scholars would oppose the use of sepa-
ration of powers considerations in the standing doctrine.213 In light 
of the American tradition of judicial oversight and of the fact that 
208 Id. at 614. 
209 See id. at 608-09. 
210 Professor Unger notes that his system of destabilization rights presupposes "far-
reaching changes in the institutional organization of the state and society," and he argues 
that "piecemeal and partial doctrinal moves" will not accomplish these changes. Id. at 614. 
211 Professor Unger writes: "this seemingly daring scheme might ... serve to guide the 
criticism and development of counterpart bodies of rule, principle, and conception in existing 
bodies of law." Id. CLS anticipates some of its difficulties by presenting itself as a movement 
to change consciousness. Cf Interview, supra note 197, at 16 (Duncan Kennedy responding 
to how he would restructure law firms to eliminate their institutional injustices). Pursuing 
this tactic may facilitate a greater range of directions in which the legal system might grow. 
See id. at 37 (Professor Kennedy emphasizing the importance of raising consciousness). 
Professor Tushnet argues that jurisprudential theories only matter insofar as they help 
"define[) the limits of ... political discussion[)," which he contends are the limits within 
which judges operate. Tushnet, Does Constitutional Theory Matter?, 65 TEX. L. REV. 777, 786-
87 (1987). 
212 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 592-93. 
213 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, supra note 16, at 694. 
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the powers of government are not truly separate in practice, it is 
questionable that separation of powers concerns should play a de-
cisive role in the issue of standing.214 In this vein, Professor Mark 
Tushnet asks why the law of standing should assume that judicial 
inquiry may offend coordinate branches of government when the 
political question doctrine initially should prevent the judiciary from 
invading inappropriate realms. 215 
Professor Tushnet's point addresses the question of what pur-
pose the standing doctrine should serve. Standing is a formality-
an arbitrary tool for identifying those activities over which a court 
mayor may not have jurisdiction.216 Judges can apply such formal-
ities as standards-searching for the reason behind the doctrine as 
the sine qua non for jurisdiction-or as general rules-searching for 
conformity to arbitrary qualifications as the sine qua non for juris-
diction. 217 A choice between either method is an inherently political 
choice between two competing world-views. 218 Standing, perhaps 
like all legal formalities, determines the ability to assert rights 
against governmental power. Consequently, courts should look for 
the reason behind the standing doctrine rather than for conformity 
to qualifications in order to further the CLS goal of destabilizing 
institutional structures. 
Professor Tushnet asserts that the Court has not looked for the 
reasons behind the standing doctrine, and he criticizes the standing 
doctrine as a set of amorphous rules that have enabled the Court 
to conceal decisions on the merits. 219 Professor Tushnet identifies 
214 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1307 
(1976). 
215 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, supra note 16, at 694. Under the political question 
doctrine, courts tend to decline to rule on issues that "the Constitution ... has committed 
... to ... another ... agency of government" and that would undermine judicial authority 
because of their political nature or on issues whose political nature would otherwise interfere 
with the functioning of the courts. L. TRIBE, ACL, supra note 3, at 96. 
216 Cf Kennedy, supra note 18, at 1691-92 (defining formalities with regard to private 
law). 
217 Cf id. at 1697-1701. 
218 See id. at 1702, 1705. 
219 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, supra note 16, at 663; Tushnet, The "Case or 
Controversy" Controversy--The Sociology of Art. III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1698, 1705 (1980) [hereinafter Tushnet, "Case or Controversy"]. "Crits," however, have 
no monopoly on examining legal doctrine cynically to determine what really motivates courts. 
Professor Tribe, for instance, reaches the same conclusion as Professor Tushnet about the 
Court's unprincipled approach to the standing doctrine. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES, supra note 98, at 100. 
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the goal of "concrete adversity" as the purpose of standing and 
proposes stripping the standing doctrine of all its elements except 
for his version of causation.220 This causation test would require 
"that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the action sufficient to 
ensure a concrete and adversarial presentation."221 Often, auxiliary 
devices such as experts or amici curiae briefs can help satisfy this 
requirement.222 In this view, separation of powers is extraneous to 
a causation analysis seeking to find the adverseness necessary to the 
proper application of the standing doctrine.223 
D. Allen v. Wright and Impediments to Institutional Restructuring 
The Allen Court used separation of powers to find causation 
too attenuated to allow standing where a group of plaintiffs asserted 
a right against an insulated governmental agency.224 Allowing the 
plaintiffs to bring their claim, however, would have facilitated re-
organization of government so as to conform better to democratic 
ideals through the resolution of conflict. 225 Separation of powers 
considerations and the Court's causation test are precisely the types 
of institutional biases and impediments to change that CLS aims to 
eliminate. 226 These biases and impediments contradict both the ad-
vances in desegregation since Brown227 and the IRS Commissioner's 
attempt to adopt guidelines substantially similar to those requested 
by the Allen plaintiffs. 228 
Perhaps most important to the CLS school's efforts to trans-
form the legal order is a clear elaboration of the issues.229 This 
clarity is necessary to determine what structures of government are 
responsible for the injury and whether less biased decision-making 
220 See Tushnet, "Case or Controversy," supra note 219, at 1706 (conditions necessary to 
create "concrete adversity" would supply the requisite causation for standing). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 1716. Note the similarity to New Legal Process theory. See supra notes 130-32 
and accompanying text. 
223 Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, supra note 16, at 693-95. On the manipulability 
of the causation standard, see L. TRIBE, ACL, supra note 3, at 130. 
224 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 761. 
225 Cf Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 592. 
226 See id. at 590-92. 
227 Hearings, supra note 76, at 3-6 (statement of Jerome Kurtz). 
228 Id. at 5. Congress's prohibition of the IRS proposals, by contrast, is an effort to 
insulate an agency from trans formative conflict and democratic forces. Cf Unger, Critical 
Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 612. 
229 See Tushnet, "Case or Controversy," supra note 219, at 1726. 
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might yield a result closer in conformity to democratic principles.230 
Deciding a case based on a formality, thus, diverts attention away 
from the injury at stake. 
Concealing decisions on the merits behind the rubric of stand-
ing likewise increases the difficulty of identifying the nature and 
scope of the rights at stake.231 Professor Gene Nichol, a commen-
tator on the standing doctrine, describes the Allen standing decision 
as equivalent to a decision on the merits because of the high stan-
dard of proof needed to prove such exact causation.232 Given the 
development of the right to freedom from the incidents of govern-
ment-sponsored discrimination,233 the Allen plaintiffs would surely 
have the requisite "adversity" to pass Professor Tushnet's standing 
test. 234 
Another aspect of the Allen case that tends both to obscure the 
rights in question and to obstruct judicial redress lies in the nature 
of the challenged action. Analysis by tax experts suggests that tax 
benefits from exemptions or deductions promoting activities or in-
terests are expenditures and that courts should treat these benefits 
like direct congressional spending programs.235 The channeling of 
230 See generally Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 580. 
231 See Tushnet, "Case or Controversy," supra note 219, at 1726. 
232 Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 640 
n.27 (1985). Professor Nichol writes: 
A strict causation standard is particularly troublesome in cases where the causation 
issue closely approximates the claim on the merits .... The crucial question on the 
merits of the Allen claim was whether the government created a subsidy that in fact 
encouraged white students to leave the public schools. Under the majority's appli-
cation of the traceability requirement, the connection between governmental action 
and the enrollment of white students in discriminatory private schools must be 
alleged in such a specific manner that there could be no speculation as to its truth. 
As a result, the plaintiffs were required to prove their case in the complaint without 
benefit of discovery or trial. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
Justice Brennan's dissent in Allen displays an awareness of how the Court's standing 
analysis hides decisions affecting substantive rights behind the smokescreen of formalities. 
Justice Brennan cites Professor Tushnet for the proposition that "the causation component 
of the Court's standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the 
merits of the underlying claims." 468 U.S. at 782 & n.1O (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, supra note 16, at 663). Thus, Critical Legal Studies may 
be influencing at least some members of the judiciary to take a more critical perspective on 
the law. 
233 See supra note 6 (discussing cases construing standing doctrine liberally to allow 
plaintiffs to challenge governmental support of discriminatory institutions). 
234 See Tushnet, "Case or Controversy," supra note 219, at 1706. 
235 See supra note 79. 
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governmental action through administrative agencies and bureau-
cracies effectively insulates that action and prevents analysis of that 
action in comparison to the ideals of a democratic system.236 In 
Allen, the IRS could not even reform itself of its own will since 
Congress blocked the Commissioner's proposed guidelines.237 
The CLS analysis shows how the Court may keep constitutional 
injuries from reaching judicial redress when institutional barriers 
harbor discrimination. Reading separation of powers concerns into 
causation analysis, as extra formalities to hurdle, diverts attention 
away from the substantive equal protection right at stake. Thus, 
although equal protection promotes an aura of fairness, in fact, 
equal protection failed to provide the Allen plaintiffs relief from a 
political system that reinforced private discrimination.238 
V. CONCLUSION: THE RELEVANCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
Separation of powers questions determine a government's sta-
bility and its amenability to change. Separation of powers is central 
to a jurisprudential view that supports limiting the ability of courts 
to interfere with the aggregation of private preferences by the 
elected branches of government. Judge Easterbrook's explanation 
of Allen is compelling in light of the importance of separation of 
powers to the Law and Economics theory and may demonstrate an 
increasing concern of the Court that remedying collective disadvan-
tage should not impinge upon the structures for aggregating and 
expressing individualistic choices. 
236 See Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 589. 
237 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Congress's action may show that agencies 
are not insulated from oversight by the political branches. The IRS proposals, however, were 
in response to a trans formative conflict regarding rights that exist as a response to the 
political system's failure to address collective disadvantage. See Unger, Critical Legal Studies, 
supra note 18, at 606; see also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 
n.4 (1938). Therefore, under the CLS scheme, it would be improper for a political branch 
to strip an agency of its ability to respond to this type of conflict. 
238 The same House of Representatives that barred the IRS from reforming its proce-
dures for revoking tax benefits for discriminatory schools also voted within twenty-four hours 
to ban the Justice Department from involvement in controversies surrounding school busing. 
Wash. Post, June 14, 1979, at A4, col. 1. The IRS proposals in response to Allen prompted 
100,000 protest letters-the most complaints in its history. L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1979, § I, at 
1, col. 2. In response, the IRS modified these proposals. [d. After a protracted battle in 
Congress and in the courts, the IRS reversed its policy, deciding that violations of public 
policies such as discrimination would no longer serve as a basis for revoking tax benefits. 
Legislation to Deny Tax Exemption to Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearings on S. 2024 
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). 
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Regardless of the merits of the Law and Economics theory's 
ordering of rights, Judge Easterbrook's substitution-at-the-margin 
theory demonstrates the difficulties of judicial regulation of agen-
cies. This theory is also useful in showing the enormous entrench-
ment of institutionalized collective disadvantage in American soci-
ety. Institutions such as the IRS, which provide tangible support to 
other discriminating institutions, are resistant to, if not immune 
from, change. 
Critical Legal Studies, however, demonstrates that the nature 
of equal protection calls for some destabilization of the existing 
order. New Legal Process demonstrates that redress of constitu-
tional injuries should not take a subordinate priority to efficiency. 
For now, structural injunctions of the type sought in Allen hold the 
most promise for redressing institutional violations of equal protec-
tion. The inability of the Allen plaintiffs to end the flow of tax 
benefits to discriminatory private schools, however, supports the 
CLS critique of rights that give the impression of justice, but really 
serve as smokescreens for society's refusal to address structural 
problems. 
The New Legal Process focus on incorporating all relevant 
perspectives into legal decisions holds great promise for developing 
law that an increasingly diverse society may see as fair from its many 
diverse perspectives. CLS similarly focuses on the need for new 
perspectives in assessing the law by proposing criticism of legal rules 
based on democratic ideals instead of on the received legal order. 
As the involvement of diverse perspectives broadens and the judi-
ciary'S tendency to destabilize other branches of government grows, 
however, the Law and Economics school's criticisms of the judiciary's 
institutional capacities will grow increasingly relevant. 
Despite the relevance of the Law and Economics institutional 
criticisms to the future growth of the judiciary, the past evolution 
of the right of minorities to freedom from government-sponsored 
discrimination and obstruction of desegregation demonstrates the 
New Legal Process dialogic theory in action. Historically, rights do 
evolve and take on new meaning. This explanation, however, may 
really be nothing more than what Critical Legal Studies condemns 
as "sanctification of the actual. "239 One reason for this condemnation 
may be the existence of cases such as Allen, where dialogue comes 
239 Unger, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 18, at 571. 
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to an end. The rise of individualistic conservatism as the ideological 
acid test for judicial appointments240 indicates that sanctifying the 
past evolution of rights may not prevent Law and Economics and 
like-minded theorists who gain judicial appointments from silencing 
dialogue over further development of those rights. 
Mark D. Robins 
240 On the Reagan-Bush judicial ideology and its impact on the courts, see Laycock, 
Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEX. L. REV. 767, 767-69 (1987); The Reagan Legacy, Nat'l 
L.j., Apr. 18, 1988, at 12, col. I; Strausser & Coyle, How Much Influence Will Far Right Wield?, 
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 21, 1988, at 3, col. 2. 
